Selbstanzeigen (Lovejoy).
It has been asserted by many writers, and appears to be generally believed, that Kant was a pioneer of biological evolutionism, and in many respects a precursor of Darwin. The present paper examines all the more important Kantian passages bearing upon the subject of evolution, from the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte to the Anthropologie, paying especial attention to the anthropological essays of 1775 and 1785 and the essay Ueber den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien. The following conclusions are believed by the writer to be established:
1. While, in the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte, Kant adopted a cosmic evolutionism, in doing so he merely did something greatly in the fashion in the first half of the eighteenth century, a period when cosmogonies were multiplied. Descartes had himself worked out his celestial mechanics into an hypothesis of solar and planetary evolution; when the Newtonian mechanics was substituted for the Cartesian, the elaboration of a cosmogony upon the new basis was an obvious enterprise, attempted by many. Kant's attempt, especially by reason of the loose way in which he uses the notion of repulsive force, is essentially crude. In any case, his cosmic evolutionism did not involve an acceptance of biological transformism.
2. From 1771 Kant also accepted what may be called anthropological evolutionism, i. e., the doctrine of the development of civilized man from a four-footed animal originally endowed with only potentiality for rationality and the social life.
3. Biological evolutionism Kant never explicitly accepted, though the half-century from 1750 to 1800 constituted the period of the true beginnings of that doctrine in the history of modern science. Before 1790 Kant, though he gave a large place to the production of new varieties within a species, emphatically denied the conceivability of the development of one true species out of another. He held to an embryolgy and to a definition of the nature of species which was incompatible with transformism. Even the celebrated passage in the Kritik der Urteilskraft, if read carefully, will not be found to admit the actual occurrence of the transformation of species. Kant by this time had, Indeed, come to acknowledge that such an hypothesis is not absurd; but in a decisive footnote he denied that there is any empirical evidence for the hypothesis. In the Anthropologie of 1778, Kant does not, as has sometimes been supposed, assert the derivation of the human species from the apes; he only mildly wonders whether at some future .revolution of Nature* the higher apes may not yet develop the powers and organs requisite for speech, rationality, and social culture. This vague passage, written at the veiy end of his life, is Kant's nearest approach to the adoption of transformism. But even such extensive future improvements in the apes would not necessarily be equivalent to a change of one .natural* species into another. Holding to the Buffonian definition of species, Kant was prepared to find a very great amount of modification occurring in the descendants of given ancestors without regarding this as Evidence of the mutability of species as such. The truth of the matter is, then, that Kant throughout most of his career employed his influence to oppose and ridicule the already developing doctrine of organic evolution, Even while, in a vague way, his own thinking showd certain Evolutionistic tendencies.
Baltimore 1911, XXI, pp. 195-222 ).
Schopenhauer's "Will" is obviously an entity having two incongruous aspects. In that aspect in which it appears as a force moving in the temporal world, a s ein ewiges Werden, the conception of it might naturally have suggested an evolutionary cosmology and biology. It is, however, said by most historians of philosophy that Schopenhauer, under the influence of the other aspect of his doctrine, was destitute of any interest in the genetic explanation of things and of any conception of the timeprocess as a cumulative and sequential development. He is usually represented as having actually opposed the biological hypothesis of evolution.
It is true that, in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, he took this position; the distinctness and unmutability of the eternal Ideas were regarded by him as implying the fixity of the organic species which were their temporal counterparts.
It is clear, however, that Schopenhauer later by 1850 or earlier recognized that his metaphysics was peculiarly congenial to an evolutionary philosophy of nature; and that he therefore reformulated his conception of the .objectification of the Will" in thoroughly evolutionistlc terms, and incorporated into his system a complete scheme of cosmogony and philogeny. This is already shown in the second edition of Der Wille in der Natur, and is set forth in full in the little treatise Zur Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Natur.
Schopenhauer's theory of organic evolution, which he appears to have derived from Robert Chambers, asserted the spontaneous generation of the lowest forms, and the derivation of higher species from these through a series of saltatory mutations. The whole process, from the first differentiation of the chemical elements up to the development of man from simian ancestors, shows the Will continuously striving for a higher and more adequate selfmanifestation; the transformation of spezies is not the result of any mechanical necessity, but of the impulse towards expansion and individuation which is the fundamental fact in all temporal existence. Thus, just at the time when Darwin was eleaborating a mechanical theory of organic evolution, and Spencer a would-be mechanistic theory of evolution in general, Schopenhauer was independently formulating an outline of an evolutionistic philosophy of the (romantic) 
